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Foreign aid, despite making up less than 1 percent of the US federal government’s 
budget, is a contentious issue in American public discourse and foreign policy. For many 
recipient states, American foreign aid comes in the form of economic development aid, 
humanitarian assistance, military assistance, or credits or lower interest rates on loans to 
purchase US goods. However, in many cases, the United States is not the sole contributor of 
assets to a state-in-need. This becomes especially complex when states that have tense relations 
with the US, such as the Russian Federation and China, also donate money to that same state. 
This thesis seeks to address in an analytic manner whether foreign aid from rival countries tends 
to induce the US to give more aid to that same country, perhaps due to a competition dynamic. 
Furthermore, the thesis also seeks to determine whether the donation of funds from countries 
with very different foreign policy objectives actually has a negative relationship with metrics of 
state quality-of-life, such as gross domestic product per capita. Analyses have shown that there 
does exist a competition dynamic between states, and that aid is given to better governed states. 
However, this aid does not seem to have a correlation with improvement in GDP per capita or 
good governance metrics. Additionally, aid is not necessarily given to recipient states most in 
need.  This thesis is only an exploratory survey and cannot make long-term causal claims; 
nevertheless, it establishes interesting evidence for the existence of a donor competition dynamic 






 Foreign aid is at present one of the most contentious issues in American foreign policy, 
yet also one of the most commonly misunderstood. Most egregiously, the actual percentage of 
the budget that goes to foreign aid is less than 1 percent, or 2.6 percent as a share of the 
discretionary budget, yet a 2010 poll indicated that Americans thought around 25 percent of our 
budget is dedicated to foreign aid.1 The same poll indicated that Americans believed about 10 
percent of our budget should be dedicated to foreign aid. It is clear that there is some 
misunderstanding of the federal budget, and while the average American would not generally be 
expected to know the intricacies of government finance, it does call some attention to a gap in 
public knowledge and reality “on the ground.” This effect may at least in part be attributed to the 
“24-hour-news cycle”; for example, in 2015, common topics on the news include the 2016 
presidential primary debates often focusing on foreign policy, the Middle Eastern refugee crisis, 
and the West’s fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. On the other hand, 
according to a Gallup poll from December 2015 only 3 percent of Americans consider the most 
important policy priority of the United States to be “Foreign policy/Foreign aid/Focus 
overseas."2 Additionally, 47 percent of respondents to an NBC/Wall Street Journal poll in 2014 
said that the US “should dial down its activity in foreign affairs.”3 While poll results and policy 
priorities evolve rapidly as new events and challenges confront the US, there is a constant level 
of skepticism that affects the work of the White House, the Department of State, and other  
                                                             
1   “American Public Vastly Overestimates Amount of U.S. Foreign Aid.” World Public Opinion. World Public 
Opinion: Global Public Opinion on International Affairs, 29 Nov 2010. Web. 29 Dec 2015.   
“US Foreign Aid: Should the United States Increase Its Budget?” Huff Post College. TheHuffingtonPost.com, Inc., 5 
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agencies tasked with the security and development of the United States and the world. With all 
these facts and figures in mind, it is abundantly clear that foreign aid is a misunderstood and 
controversial topic worthy of greater public scrutiny and understanding.  
 To understand foreign aid, the most logical starting point is a baseline definition, and 
unfortunately, even this is inherently controversial. Peter Burnell writes, “Foreign aid can be 
construed as inter-societal transfers of resources that are intended by all the relevant parties’, 
especially the provider, to serve first and foremost the recipients’ needs, interests, or wants.”4 
This broad definition casts a wide net over what can be considered foreign aid, from food 
donations in sub-Saharan African to infrastructural development loans in south Asia to even 
military funding for the Afghani armed forces. Official foreign aid datasets include grants, 
interest-free loans, and concessionary loans. This definition also does not specifically limit 
foreign aid to governmental organizations, but also includes donations by private charities and 
for-profit organizations. One of the more infamous examples of this is the One for One policy of 
TOMS to donate a pair of shoes to a child in an underdeveloped country for every pair of shoes 
sold at a retailer.5 This policy and similar policies are not without controversy; as Nick Wadhams 
wrote in TIME, “…it’s not that hard to get shirts in Africa. Flooding the market with free goods 
could bankrupt the people who already sell them.”6 While the intentions of these donations to the 
poorest countries on the planet are generally altruistic, they are often short-term patches that 
actually kick the long-term problem further down the road. There is not a general consensus on  
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what should be counted as aid; for instance, Zinkin further restricts the definition of aid to pure 
donation, stating that “Aid is charity. If it is not charity, it is not aid. It may be enlightened self 
interest; mutual defence; a boost for the export trade; a sop to a troublesome ally; it cannot be 
aid.”7 While this definition takes a more positive view of foreign aid and its motivations, this 
thesis will take a more utilitarian view of foreign aid. For this purpose, foreign aid will be 
defined as a payment made by an industrialized or industrializing state, or international 
organization, to a developing or underdeveloped state for the purposes of fulfilling a goal of the 
donor state or organization. This would include Zinkin’s allusion to “enlightened self-interest”; 
for example, the government of the United States may consider alleviating world hunger to be a 
moral imperative, and thus a major goal for the country. While the results may fill an altruistic 
goal, addressing world hunger likely provides utility and happiness to the people and government 
of the US. Foreign aid is not always state-to-state donations, but is often channeled through 
super-state organizations such as the United Nations. 
 The United Nations, perhaps the most well-known and prestigious intergovernmental 
organization in the 21st century, serves as a major channel for development and foreign aid, and 
is seen by many as a successful organization. The UN was actually first referenced in the 1942 
Declaration of the United Nations, pledging the forces of 26 nations, primarily the United States 
and the United Kingdom, to fight against the Axis powers of Germany, Italy, and Japan in World 
War II.8 Of course, as the Axis alliance is now confined to history, the purpose and structure of 
this organization has evolved dramatically, and now works not only in peacekeeping, but also in 
developing the poorer nation-states of the world. The most publicized goals of the UN in the  
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early 21st century consisted of the Millennium Development Goals, eight goals for international 
development set to be obtained by the end of 2015. The goals consisted of: eradicating extreme 
poverty and world hunger, achieving universal primary education, promoting gender equality, 
reducing child mortality, improving maternal health, combating HIV/AIDS and other diseases, 
ensuring environmental stability, and creating a global partnership for development.9 In some 
measures, these goals have been successful; for example, the proportion of the population living 
on less than $1.25 a day dropped from around 35 percent in 1981 to 22 percent in 2008.10 The 
proportion of children getting a primary education rose from 83 percent in 2000 to 91 percent in 
2015.11 Due to the endogenous and complex nature of development and international finance, not 
all credit can be given to the efforts of the United Nations, but the cancellation of debts by the 
finance ministers of the Group of 8 countries totaling $55 billion12 in the fulfillment of these 
goals had a significant effect on the ability of developing countries to invest in their own 
infrastructure. 
 The efforts of the United Nations will be continued in 2016 with the Sustainable 
Development Goals, which consist of seventeen objectives to achieve by 2030, including 1) no 
poverty, 2) zero hunger, 3) good health and well-being, 4) quality education, 5) gender equality, 
6) clean water and sanitation, 7) affordable and clean energy, 8) decent work and economic 
growth, 9) industry, innovation, and infrastructure, 10) reduced inequalities, 11) sustainable  
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cities and communities, 12) responsible consumption and production, 13) climate action, 14) life 
below water, 15) life on land, 16) peace, justice, and strong institutions, and 17) partnerships for 
the goals.13 While an in-depth analysis of each of these goals is beyond the scope of this thesis, 
the understanding of what the aims of the international community are important to recognize as 
a contrast to the goals pursued in bilateral manner between a rich state and a poor state.  
 Unfortunately for the proponents of foreign aid, in many cases it does little to actually 
address the intended issues, and becomes a political tool used as a bargaining lever or even to 
entrench corruption. In 2016, one egregious example of this effect comes from the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea, or North Korea, ruled autocratically by Supreme Leader Kim Jong-
un, the grandson of DPRK “founding father” Kim Il-sung. Kim is well-known around the world 
for threatening the nuclear annihilation of the country’s enemies, which primarily include the 
Republic of Korea (South Korea), Japan, and the United States. While the international 
consensus in 2016 is that Kim does not have the power to reach the United States with nuclear 
arms, there is a possibility that the DPRK can cause significant harm with missiles, especially 
taking into account that Seoul, the capital of South Korea, lies in close proximity to the de-
militarized zone (DMZ) that separates the North and the South. In many cases, Kim makes these 
threats, and then is placated by food aid to be sent to the DPRK. This creates a dilemma for the 
rich nations of the Pacific Rim; is food aid to be given to the DPRK, entrenching the Kim 
regime, or should these pleas be ignored and the innocent civilians of the DPRK left to starve? 
This is a vexing situation for international policymakers with an unfortunate equilibrium, and 
foreign gift aid at present seems unable to address this dilemma.   
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This case study is merely one egregious example of the limitations of grant-in-aid, but 
when studying the aggregate issue, some trends arise. Roger C. Riddell writes: 
Many problems with aid arise from poor decision-making. Some problems with aid are 
specific to particular projects and programmes, and arise from the wrong decisions made 
by individuals and agencies as to the type of aid that should be provided to particular 
recipients, often as a result of an insufficient understanding of what is needed, and how 
aid may help. Some problems with aid arise because of individuals and agencies making 
over-optimistic assumptions about the capacity of organizations receiving aid to use it 
effectively. Other problems arise because donors or recipients either fail to undertake risk 
assessments or make assumptions about the external environment which turn out to be 
wrong, and the unexpected effects of those errors undermine or eclipse the expected 
beneficial outcomes intended.14    
The first point made by Riddell could include organizations such as TOMS; while the most 
simplistic assumption is that donating more goods to a poor country is by default a net benefit, 
the company fails to consider that there are domestic footwear producers in sub-Saharan states 
and that TOMS takes these individuals out of development boosts entirely. TOMS fails to 
conduct an analysis of need in underdeveloped states, and the consequences are large.  
 As mentioned by Riddell, other problems with aid come about when an individual or 
agency is over-optimistic about the effective use of their donation. I would add that problems 
with aid are even more likely to come about when an individual or agency is over-optimistic or 
naïve about the willingness of a recipient to use their aid effectively. Unfortunately, whenever  
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giving aid to any sort of non-democratic regime, there is an accountability moral hazard issue, as 
without proper mechanisms there is no way to ensure that simple funding does not go directly 
into the pockets of a nation’s oligarchs. Another distinct possibility is that the donation of aid for 
ostensibly noble purposes will allow the recipient regime to reallocate their own funding to 
military or weapons research purposes against the inclinations of the donor state. In short, 
without accountability, foreign aid can actually exacerbate a bad situation within a state. 
 As previously referenced extensively, there is a great deal of literature relating to the 
impact of various forms of foreign aid. They have come to varying conclusions, but a common 
thread throughout is that the foreign aid sent through multilateral means has some level of 
effectiveness, while state-to-state aid varies on a recipient and government basis. However, one 
area that only has limited research, particularly in the post-Cold War era, is the interaction of 
unilateral aid donors in a recipient state. For example, when the United States and the Russian 
Federation both give aid to a recipient state, what is the impact of that aid? There must be some 
effect, as these major powers have different aims with their grants and donations. 
 The United States and its major allies in the United Kingdom and France have defined 
foreign policy goals that affect aid dispersal, yet even these policies differ from one another. The 
mission statement of the U.S. Department of State is: 
…to shape and sustain a peaceful, prosperous, just, and democratic world and foster 
 conditions for stability and progress for the benefit of the American people and people 




 forward in partnership as we invest in the shared security and prosperity that will 
 ultimately better prepare us for the challenges of tomorrow.15  
In a similar yet more succinct vein, the mission statement of the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID) is “…to end extreme poverty and to promote resilient, democratic 
societies while advancing our security and prosperity.”16 In contrast, the mission of the UK’s 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) is to promote “…the United Kingdom’s interests 
overseas, supporting our citizens and businesses around the globe.”17 Former French prime 
minister and later foreign minister Laurent Fabius describes the four foreign policy priorities of 
the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs as: 
  peace and security; organization and preservation of the planet; reorientation and revival 
 of Europe; promotion and strengthening of France, so that our country remains an  
 influential reference point on the international stage, a promoter of peace, protection, 
 balance, and progress.18 
These three countries, with strong alliances but their own sovereignties and values, already have 
differences between them in their foreign policy. For example, the United States chooses to 
maintain two separate agencies for diplomacy and international development aid, working in 
close concert, unlike France, which chooses to combine these goals into one ministry. More 
substantively, the stated goal of the UK’s FCO is to promote the interests of British citizens,  
                                                             
15 “Fiscal Year 2014 Agency Financial Report: Investing in Shared Security and Prosperity.” United States 
Department of State. U.S. Department of State Bureau of the Comptroller and Global Financial Services Office of 
Financial Policy, Reporting, and Analysis. Web. 5 Jan 2016. 
16 “Mission, Vision, and Values.” U.S. Agency for International Development. USAID, 12 Nov 2015. Web. 5 Jan 
2016. 
17 “About.” Foreign & Commonwealth Office - GOV.UK. Government Digital Service. Web. 5 Jan 2016. 
18 “MAEDI 21 – Global diplomacy for the 21st century.” France-Diplomatie – Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
International Development. French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development. Web. 5 Jan 2016. 
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while the US claims to focus on increasing prosperity for both Americans and people across the 
world. With a referendum on UK membership in the European Union (EU) expected in 2017, it 
is also interesting to note that France’s foreign ministry notes the importance of reviving Europe, 
while the UK’s statement makes no notice of pan-European sentiments. Overall, while these 
three countries obviously enjoy a great overlap in goals, they are all unique states with their own 
approaches and priorities.  
 If there are some differences even between states that are close allies, surely these North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies will find larger gulfs between themselves and the 
foreign policies of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China. Russia’s stated 
goal with foreign aid is as follows:  
 Aware of its historical responsibility for the formation of the modern system of  
 international relations and its further improvement, the Russian Federation considers 
 international development assistance as an effective mechanism to solve global and  
 regional problems, and to respond to new challenges and threats. Consistent  
 implementation of this Concept will help promote Russia's national interests in this area 
 by maximizing the return on aid provided. Experience accumulated in the field of  
 international cooperation and its own donor potential allow Russia, while enhancing the 
 time-tested formats of participation in international cooperation and in multilateral 
 projects, to place greater emphasis on targeted bilateral assistance programmes and to 




Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2020 and the Concept of the Russian Federation's 
 Foreign Policy.19  
While initially similar to the statements made by the US, the UK, and France, one major 
difference is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’s (MFA) emphasis on “targeted bilateral assistance 
programmes.” One major implication with this statement is that the policy of the Russian MFA 
in the 2010s is to reduce focus on working with international organizations such as the United 
Nations, and instead act unilaterally according to the whims of the current regime. While none of 
the aforementioned states specifically mention international organizations (with the exception of 
France’s allusions to the European Union,) Russia is alone in specifically deemphasizing this 
channel for aid distribution, which historically may be the most effective in actually addressing 
the root causes of development issues worldwide. 
 The stated foreign policy of the People’s Republic of China is admittedly more neutral, 
stating that “China unswervingly pursues an independent foreign policy of peace. The 
fundamental goals of this policy are to preserve China's independence, sovereignty and territorial 
integrity, create a favorable international environment for China's reform and opening up and 
modernization construction, maintain world peace and propel common development.”20 
Ostensibly, this statement appears similar to those of the NATO powers seen above, but one 
possible area of contention is the allusion to “territorial integrity.” In 2016, China is involved in a 
wide stretch of land disputes in the South China Sea, and has been accused by the international 
community of using artificial islands to enhance their land claims. Of course, there is also the  
                                                             
19 “CONCEPT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION’S STATE POLICY IN THE AREA OF INTERNATIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE.” MFA of Russia, 20 Oct 2014. Web. 6 Jan 2016. 
20 “Policies and Activities.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. Ministry of Foreign 
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well-known historical dispute between the PRC and the Republic of China (colloquially known 
as Taiwan or the ROC) over rights to the name and powers of “China” in the United Nations, as 
well as sovereignty of the landmass of these de facto separate nations. Historical disputes with 
India, Bhutan, and various other states persist, as well as internal conflict over Buddhist Tibet, 
primarily Muslim Xinjiang, and other regions. The PRC’s foreign policy is indeed influenced by 
its unique geopolitical position. After analyzing the qualitative differences between these major 
Security Council nations, I believe that a quantitative analysis of the effects of these policies on 
foreign aid and development in the 21st century is a useful evaluative tool over the effectiveness 
of foreign aid overall.  
II: Introduction to the Data 
 As with many high-level international public policy models, one of the most challenging 
tasks is actually finding proper data, as data collection in developing states is not generally a 
priority. Even in nations such as the United States, it is often challenging to find data from before 
the 2000s in areas such as foreign trade statistics and economic indices. Nevertheless, there are 
some comprehensive data of the foreign aid contributions by the major Security Council powers 
mentioned above, gross domestic product (GDP) per capita of many nations, and indices of good 
governance available to the public. Much of my most useful data came from the World Bank, 
where comprehensive data on foreign aid outlays by the United States, the United Kingdom, and 
France were available, as well as GDP data for most nations worldwide.21 22 However, in order  
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to break down the foreign aid donations by donor state, I retrieved additional data on Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) by donor state from the Organisation for Economic Co-
Operation and Development website.23 However, as the PRC is not a member of the DAC and 
the OECD lacks this data, I needed to conduct more research with external sources in order to 
find their aid data. As of January 2016, while I was unable to find sufficient data from a 
government or interstate body, I was able to find information on aid by donor state using 
AidData.org, a rigorously researched and tested database unofficially tracking Chinese foreign 
aid activity in Asia, Africa, and elsewhere.24 Based on the data available for each of these states, 
I decided to focus on foreign aid ranging from 2011 to 2013, as more recent data is not available 
for all of the P5 states, and quality of public data suffers considerably before 2011. 
Unfortunately, this limits the scope of econometric models that are possible, such as long-range 
log analysis. With this data, I was able to compute what amount of funding was coming to each 
state, who was giving the money to the state, and what funding was coming from states besides 
the aforementioned Permanent 5 (P5) Security Council member-states.  
 One important caveat to add to aggregate-level aid analysis is that not all foreign aid is 
created equal – most importantly, some aid comes in the form of grants, while much of it is 
disbursed in the form of loans. In particular, aid from the PRC in Africa and elsewhere primarily 
consists of infrastructural loans. Some loans may be interest-free, which could still be considered 
a gift in the sense that it gives recipients the opportunity to improve their liquidity with relatively  
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little penalty, and in the sense that the donor loses the opportunity to put this funding into 
profitable investments. On the other hand, many loans do have a more traditional interest-rate 
structure. Frustratingly, the convention is to include not just the actual aid section of the loan 
(i.e., the interest rate break) but the entire principal of the loan. Nonetheless, as there is some 
international consistency in this standard, the upward bias is relatively consistent for an 
aggregate analysis comparing the reactivity of one donor state to another. On the other hand, this 
may bias the data away from a statistically significant relationship between ODA and GDP. An 
interesting future study would be the effectiveness of grants versus interest-free loans and 
concessional loans, but that is beyond the scope of this undergraduate thesis. 
 As another measure of aid effectiveness, I was also interested in governance, and thus 
searched for a metric to measure corruption in recipient states before and after aid was given. I 
found a useful statistic called the Corruption Perceptions Index, which measures governance 
from 0 (most corrupt) to 100 (least corrupt,)25 26 with the exception of 2011, where the score 
ranged from 0 to 10. 27 This index serves as a proxy for the effectiveness of aid in promoting 
regime improvement or change; additionally, it indicates whether P5 states are rewarding 
underdeveloped states with good governance, or focusing more on political expediency.  
  
                                                             
25 “Corruption Perceptions Index 2013.” TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL. Transparency International. Web. 7 
Jan 2016.  
The sources for the Corruption Perceptions Index include expert opinions of the level of corruption in a country 
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Economic Risk Consultancy, Political Risk Services, the World Bank, the World Economic Forum, and the World 
Justice Project.  
26 “Corruption Perceptions Index 2012.” TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL. Transparency International. Web. 7 
Jan 2016. 
27 “Corruption Perceptions Index 2011.” TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL. Transparency International. Web. 7 
Jan 2016. 
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I was also interested in using data for Gini coefficients in my modeling. Gini coefficients 
are a measure of income distribution in a society, where 0 indicates every resident having 
identical income, and a score of 1 indicates that one individual has all the income in a society. 
Unfortunately, after further review of data available in early 2016, comprehensive data is not 
publicly available for a significant portion of nations. This can be due to a variety of factors, as 
opaque financing in a developing state, or simple lack of resources to dedicate to the attention of 
collecting this data, but despite my best efforts, it cannot be included in a 2016 analysis.   
Before delving into model design, evaluating the data and the trends over time is a useful 
exercise. The map below shows GDP per capita in 2013: 
 
Figure 1: Map displaying GDP per capita in 2013 in constant 2005 dollars28 
In Figure 1, we see clearly that states geopolitically referred to as “the West” are along with 
Japan and South Korea the richest states in the world. The relative wealth of the United States, 
the United Kingdom, and France certainly account for the large cultural influence these states 
have had around the world, and explains their ability to influence the development agenda.  
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Interestingly, Russia and the PRC do not appear significantly richer than their neighbors, even 
though they are dominant regional powers. In these cases, population size plays a major role; 
with the PRC the most populous country in the world, and Russia over twice the population of 
any EU state, they are able to maintain regional dominance even though the individual in these 
countries is not excessively wealthy.   
 In comparison, one can examine the foreign aid donated in the US by country, shown in 
Figure 2 below: 
 
Figure 2: Foreign assistance worldwide from the US in 2013. Lighter colors indicate higher 
levels of foreign aid. Grayed out countries, such as the US, received no foreign aid in 2013.29 
Of immediate note is that this graph is not a perfect mirror of Figure 1. For instance, Afghanistan 
and Pakistan receive significantly more aid than their neighbors, despite similar levels of GDP   
per capita. We see similar examples in the Pacific Rim, where the Philippines receive more aid 
than their neighbors on Southeast Asia, despite similar income levels. Bolivia is the poorest  
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country in South America, yet Colombia and Peru have significantly higher levels of US 
funding. This would indicate that the donation of foreign aid is not solely based on poverty. 
The following map of Russian foreign aid was generated in R:30 31 32 33 34 35
 
Figure 2: Foreign aid from Russia in 2012, in millions USD. White countries did not have data. 
Foreign aid from Russia in 2012 as it turns out was quite concentrated. We see that the largest 
single recipient of Russian aid in 2012 is the Kyrgyz Republic in central Asia. Other major  
 
                                                             
30 R Core Team (2015). R: A language and environment for statistical computing. R Foundation for Statistical 
Computing, Vienna, Austria. URL https://www.R-project.org/. 
31 RStudio Team (2015). RStudio: Integrated Development for R. RStudio, Inc., Boston, MA. URL 
http://www.rstudio.com/. 
32 South, Andy 2011 rworldmap: A New R package for Mapping Global Data. The R Journal 
  Vol. 3/1 : 35-43. 
33 Original S code by Richard A. Becker, Allan R. Wilks. R version by Ray Brownrigg. 
  Enhancements by Thomas P Minka and Alex Deckmyn. (2016). maps: Draw Geographical Maps. 
  R package version 3.0.2. http://CRAN.R-project.org/package=maps 
34 Roger Bivand and Nicholas Lewin-Koh (2015). maptools: Tools for Reading and Handling 
  Spatial Objects. R package version 0.8-37. http://CRAN.R-project.org/package=maptools 
35 Original S code by Richard A. Becker and Allan R. Wilks. R version by Ray Brownrigg. 
  (2015). mapdata: Extra Map Databases. R package version 2.2-5. 
  http://CRAN.R-project.org/package=mapdata 
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recipients of Russian aid include Tajikistan, the Syrian Arab Republic, Serbia, and Mongolia. 
For purposes of legibility and focus, the map is not comprehensive, but Cuba, Nicaragua, and 
North Korea are also major recipients of Russian aid. This marks a departure from US aid, which 
is distributed nearly the whole world over. One can see that Russian aid is primarily focused on 
regional allies such as Syria and former Soviet member states and satellites, as well as key Latin 
American states, which again introduces the plausibility of aid as a political tool rather than a 
humanitarian device. 
 Chinese foreign aid in 2012 follows a pattern that may not be immediately intuitive. The 
following map was generated in the same manner as Figure 2: 
 
Figure 3: Foreign aid from the PRC in 2012. White states had no data. 
We see immediately that much of China’s foreign aid is actually focused in Africa and Latin 
America, with a large concentration in Venezuela. Cambodia is also a major recipient of aid,  
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which seems natural due to geographic proximity, but the other investments may seem more 
surprising. Yun Sun from the Brookings Institution describes this phenomenon of investment in 
the Global South, saying “Much Chinese financing to Africa is associated with securing the 
continent’s natural resources. Using what is sometimes characterized as the ‘Angola Model,’ 
China frequently provides low-interest loans to nations who rely on commodities, such as oil or 
mineral resources, as collateral.”36 The range of China’s foreign aid focus indicates a model 
focused on financial gain rather than purely geopolitical interest, but in either case, foreign aid as 
a policy tool is clearly evident in the cases of all these highlighted P5 countries. 
 
Figure 4: Net official development assistance as a percentage of gross national income, 2000-
2014.  Red is UK, blue is France, black is Development Assistance Committee (DAC) average, 
purple is USA, orange is Russia. Not pictured: PRC (not a member of the DAC as of 2016.) 
 One interesting tidbit immediately visible is that the United States and Russia both donate 
significantly smaller portions of their GDP as foreign aid to other nations when compared to the  
                                                             
36 Sun, Yun. “China’s Aid to Africa: Monster or Messiah?” Brookings Institution. Brookings, Feb 2014. Web. 14 Jan 
2016.  
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DAC average, and the UK donates a significantly larger portion of its budget to foreign 
assistance. But perhaps most importantly, there do not appear to be major fluctuations in foreign 
aid donations, particularly in the case of the US and Russia. While politicians from different 
political parties may make promises about the foreign policy of a country, this financial metric 
shows that these promises often do not play out in reality. As one would expect from time series 
data, significant auto-correlation will likely be an issue in creating a model for this data. 
 A third metric of interest is the aforementioned Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI): 
 
Figure 5: Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) in 2014 for the world. Darker colors indicate lower 
CPI, or higher levels of perceived corruption.37 
As one may expect, the least corrupt countries in the world tend to be some of the most affluent 
countries as depicted in Figure 1. However, there are some notable exceptions; Chile, Uruguay, 
and Botswana score surprisingly well on these metrics despite having relatively low GDP per  
                                                             
37 “2014 Corruption Perceptions Index – Results.” TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL: the global coalition against 
corruption. Transparency International. Web. 11 Jan 2016. 
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capita scores. On the other hand, South Korea fares relatively poorly despite its high level of 
development. Countries that have low levels of corruption and high GDP per capita scores such 
as Canada and New Zealand are not generally considered in need of foreign aid, so there is a 
possibility that foreign aid will appear to be biased towards more corrupt countries. One of the 
auxiliary goals of this analysis is to see whether less corrupt countries are rewarded for their 
good governance, but also whether countries improve from year to year following aid from the 
US or another country. 
III: Models 
 My models seek primarily to address what factors incentivize P5 countries to donate aid 
to a state in need, and whether competition is a factor playing a role in the results of foreign aid 
programs. I hypothesize that there is a competition dynamic; i.e., states that receive large 
amounts of aid from both the US and Russia will have worse outcomes in terms of GDP per 
capita and CPI than states receiving aid primarily from only the US or Russia. I additionally 
hypothesize that states with higher CPI scores (less corrupt) will receive more foreign aid than 
states with lower CPI scores (more corrupt.) As mentioned previously, the small scope of data 
present in this analysis prevent long-run causal claims due to fewer potential lags, but here I am 
interested in seeing whether this effect exists in the short term of the 2010. My models will 
consist of ordinary least square regressions, including lagged terms when appropriate in order to 
control for autocorrelation, a major dilemma in time-series models. My first model is as follows: 
(1) GDP2013 = Β0 + Β1(US2012) + Β2(AlliedAid2012) + Β3(RU2012) + Β4(CN2012) + 
Β5(CPI2012) 
Where GDP2013 = GDP per capita for a given state in 2013 in USD 
US2012 = US foreign aid to a given state in 2012 in USD 
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AlliedAid2012 = combined UK and French foreign aid to a given state in 2012 in USD 
RU2012 = Russian foreign aid to a given state in 2012 in millions USD 
CN2012 = Chinese foreign aid to a given state in 2012 in USD 
CPI2012 = CPI for a given state in 2012 
I estimate this OLS model using RStudio, and yielded the following results: 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-value P-value 
(Intercept) -6,961 2,139 -3.255 0.00154** 
US2012 8.218e-07 2.450e-06 0.335 0.73796 
AlliedAid2012 -6.156e-06 5.284e-06 -1.167 0.24597 
RU2012 -257.7 313.3 -0.823 0.41261 
CN2012 -1.221e-06 1.755e-06 -0.696 0.48822 
CPI2012 346.5 47.83 7.245 8.46e-11*** 
 
Adjusted R-squared:  0.3731  
F-statistic: 13.74 on 5 and 102 DF,  p-value: 2.991e-10 
 
From these coefficients, we observe little in the way of a causal relationship, and fail to prove a 
significance in aid from any country in the previous period to gross domestic product in the 
following period. One significant exception to this pattern lies in CPI; we observe a highly 
significant relationship between lower levels of corruption, or a higher CPI, and higher GDP per 
capita values. If one compares Figure 1 and Figure 5, this seems highly logical; states that tend 
towards more open markets and away from cronyism tend to perform better financially as 
incentives to innovate and open businesses emerge. The 95 percent confidence interval for B5 is 
(252.7532, 440.2468.) This means that for every CPI point in 2012, we are 95 percent confident  
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that ceteris paribus (all else equal,) expected GDP per capita increases by some value between 
$252.75 and $440.25. With CPI as an index ranging from 0 to 100, this implies a range of 
variation of $27,373.50. This means that of states that receive identical amounts of aid from 
every P5 member, ceteris paribus, a state with a CPI of 0 (extremely corrupt) will have a GDP 
per capita $27,373.50 less than a state with a CPI of 100 (hardly corrupt at all.) The below graph 
describes the general trend: 
 
Figure 6: CPI in 2012 vs GDP in 2013. The equation for the line of best fit is GDP2013 = 
363.2(CPI2012) – 8314.5 
We can observe that this relationship is not perfect, for states with similar CPIs have 
significantly different GDP per capita values in 2013. But despite this variation, there is a clear 
trend in this sample that lower levels of perceived corruption correspond to higher levels of GDP 
per capita. 
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To study this relationship further, I took the first difference of this model, modeling whether 
changes in foreign aid or CPI from one year to another will inspire a change in GDP. Of course, 
in these policy problems it is difficult to completely rule out endogeneity issues, but this first-
differenced model does reduce the likelihood that endogeneity is a major concern: 
(2)       GDP2013diff  = δ0 + δ1 (US2012diff) + δ2 (RU2012diff) + δ3 (CN2012diff)  
+ δ4 (AlliedAid2012diff) + δ5 (CPI2012diff) 
Where GDP2013diff = GDP per capita in 2013 – GDP per capita in 2012 in USD 
US2012diff = US aid in 2012 – US aid in 2011 in USD 
RU2012diff = Russian aid in 2012 – Russian aid in 2011 in millions USD 
CN2012diff = Chinese aid in 2012 – Chinese aid in 2011 in USD 
AlliedAid2012diff = UK + French aid in 2012 – UK + French aid in 2011 in USD 
CPI2012diff = CPI in 2012 – CPI in 201138 
Estimating this model in RStudio yielded the following results: 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-value P-value 
Intercept 3.541 53.65 0.066 0.948 
US2012diff 2.672e-09 3.383e-07 0.008 0.994 
RU2012diff 24.47 18.96 1.291 0.200 
CN2012diff -1.885e-09 3.444e-08 -0.055 0.956 
AlliedAid2012diff -1.500e-09 3.602e-07 -0.004 0.997 
CPI2012diff 9.238 11.23 0.823 0.413 
Adjusted R-squared:  -0.02143  
                                                             
38 Transparency International used a CPI ranging from 0 to 10 in 2011 and prior, with significance to the tenths 
customary. Subsequently, for ease of analysis, CPI2011 is actually CPI in 2011 multiplied by 10 to better reflect 
changes from 2011 to 2012.  
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F-statistic: 0.551 on 5 and 102 DF,  p-value: 0.7372 
 
In Model (2) we observe no significant relationships, failing to disprove the null hypothesis that 
none of these variables explain changes in GDP from 2012 to 2013. While this model does not 
seem to provide new results, it does verify that these variables persist. Consider our sample: 
 
Figure 7: CPI in 2011 vs. the change in CPI from 2011-2012. Line of best fit is CPI2012diff = 
4.520 – 0.032 (CPI2011). 
In Figure 7, we see that with a change in measurement in CPI from a 10-point scale to a 100-
point scale, as mentioned in (2), CPI2012diff for most of these countries are clustered around 5, 
and do not significantly change from country to country on a year to year basis. This change is 
almost entirely due to an aforementioned change in measurement from a 10-point scale to a 100-
point scale. Since this difference in difference value is nearly consistent among the sample, it  
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logically follows that the coefficient for CPI2012diff in (2) will not display the same significance 
as the coefficient for CPI2012 in (1).  
The difference-in-difference modeling technique can also be used in our first look at 
identifying a competition dynamic. Another term I elected to include in models was aid from the 
rest of the world; although we do not specifically focus on some larger states such as Germany, 
Japan, and India in this thesis, their aid can still have an impact on foreign policy for the P5 
Security Council members, and so they are included as a control variable. Model (3) is as 
follows: 
(3) US2013diff = δ0 + δ1(AlliedAid2012diff) + δ2(RU2012diff) + δ3(CN2012diff)  
+ δ4 (RestofWorld2012diff) + δ5(GDP2012diff) + δ6 (CPI2012diff) 
Where US2013diff = US aid in 2013 – US aid in 2012 
AlliedAid2012diff = UK and French aid in 2012 – UK and French aid in 2011 
RU2012diff = Russian aid in 2012 – Russian aid in 2011 in millions USD 
CN2012diff = Chinese aid in 2012 – Chinese aid in 2011 
RestofWorld2012diff = Total aid to a country less aid from the P5 in 2012 – Total aid to 
a country less aid from the P5 in 2011 
GDP2012diff = GDP of a state in 2012 less GDP of that state in 2011 







The output of this model in R is as follows: 
Regressor Coefficient Std. Error T-value P-value 
Intercept -4.293e-07 1.666e+07 -2.578 0.0114* 
AlliedAid2012diff 0.01255 0.1247 0.101 0.9200 
RU2012diff 1.284e+07 6.279e+06 2.045 0.0434* 
CN2012diff 0.009299 0.01082 0.859 0.3922 
RestofWorld2012diff -0.02003 0.05388 -0.372 0.7109 
GDP2012diff 1.699e+04 2.820e+04 0.602 0.5482 
CPI2012diff 8.027e+06 3.497e+06 2.295 0.0238* 
Adjusted R-squared:  0.04859 




Figure 8: Change in US aid from 2012 to 2013 vs. change in Russian aid from 2011 to 2012. 
Line of best fit is US2013dif = (-1.399e+07) + 1.271e-05(RU2012dif) 
This model provides promising results with respect to our competition dynamic hypothesis; 
changes in Russian foreign aid from 2011 to 2012 have a significant relationship with changes in 
US foreign aid from 2012 to 2013. The 95 percent confidence interval for B2 is ($6,561,000, 
$19,119,000), meaning that for every million dollar increase in Russian foreign aid from 2011 to 
2012, ceteris paribus, US foreign aid is expected to increase from some value between 
$6,561,000 and $19,119,000. In other words, there is evidence here that the United States is 
responding to the foreign aid obligations made by Russia. On the other hand, the small adjusted-
R squared value would indicate that this is a far from perfect relationship. Nonetheless, the 
competition dynamic is certainly a part of the story and one that bears further research.  
 One final model that warrants review is a lagged model of US aid in 2013 on our 
previous variables. The model is as follows: 
(4) US2013 = δ0 + δ1(AlliedAid2012) + δ2(RU2012) + δ3(CN2012) + δ4 (GDP2012) + 
δ5(CPI2012) + δ6 (US2012) 
Where US2013 = US aid in 2013 
AlliedAid2012 = aid from the UK and France in 2012 
RU2012 = Russian aid in 2012, in millions US 
CN2012 = Chinese aid in 2012 
GDP2012 = GDP per capita in 2012 
CPI2012 = CPI in 2012 
US2012 = US aid in 2012 
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The output of this ordinary least squares (OLS) model in R is as follows: 
Regressor Coefficient Std. Error T-value P-value 
Intercept 6.810e+06 2.225e+07 0.306 0.760 
AlliedAid2012 0.08417 0.05273 1.596 0.114 
RU2012 1.232e+06 3.117e+06 0.395 0.694 
CN2012 0.09035 0.01744 5.179 1.14e-06*** 
GDP2012 -1045 981.4 -1.065 0.289 
CPI2012 2.781e+05 5.821e+05 0.478 0.634 
US2012 0.6735 0.02430 27.719 ~0*** 
Adjusted R-squared: 0.9162 




Figure 9: Chinese aid in 2012 vs. US aid in 2013. Line of best fit is US2013 = (9.058e+09) + 
1.423e-01(CN2012) 
As we would expect from a real-world econometric time series analysis, there is significant 
autocorrelation from one year to the next, so the coefficient of US2012 is by no means 
groundbreaking. A lot of the foreign aid decisions of a country will merely be continuations of a 
previous level, due to either a lack of significant change in the situation of the recipient state or 
bureaucracy slowing down processes. For the same autocorrelative reason, the adjusted R-
squared, though highly encouraging, is not necessarily an unexpected result. What does bear 
study is the responsiveness of US aid in 2013 to Chinese aid in 2012; even when controlling for 
lagged US aid, GDP, and governance, there is still a highly significant correlation between 
Chinese and American foreign aid decisions. I would argue that this is due to a reactive 
relationship, with the US working to ensure that they have influences in similar regions than does 
China. In the end, one could come up with endless models in order to prove or disprove a trend, 
but my work has shown that there is at least plausible evidence of reactive donor competition in 
the 2010s, more than twenty years following the end of the Cold War. 
 Again, endogeneity is a major issue with a survey of this length of time. Unfortunately, 
with the small data sample I have, it is quite difficult to make any causal claims, although the 
first differenced models do have some additional explanatory power. Future researchers may 
wish to look into back-casting some of the variables I have used here in order to create a longer 





 The large conclusions we have come to in this analysis are 1: the United States rewards 
good governance to some degree, as we see in model (3) and 2: the United States does exhibit 
some responsiveness to the foreign aid decisions of Russia and China, as in models (3) and (4). 
Interestingly, none of our models show any relation between GDP and CPI, and model (2) does 
not indicate that changes in governance indicate changes in foreign aid from the US. How could 
this be?  
 First, we can delve into the US aid – CPI relationship; that is, a positive correlation 
between greater standards of governance and US monies. It is a happy conclusion that this 
relationship has such backing, but how is this the case? One key possibility is the existence of 
foreign aid agencies such as the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC).39 The MCC is 
unique in that it maintains rigorous standards of eligibility in terms of good governance. 
Additionally, the MCC funds programs that are primarily developed and implemented by the 
recipient state, stepping in merely to refine the program and to disburse funds.40 The MCC does 
not make up the majority of foreign aid spending, but it has contributed about $8.56 billion in aid 
as of June 2015, and has pledged about $10.7 billion in this same time period.41 Much of this 
work consists of infrastructural development and job training in areas as diverse as El Salvador, 
Liberia, Moldova, and the Philippines. The models provided above would indicate that there has 
been some level of success with regards to the selection of countries; however as mentioned  
                                                             
39 I would like to thank Oyebola Olabisi Okunogbe, PhD in Public Policy candidate at Harvard University, for the 
constructive comments regarding the inclusion of the MCC in this discussion.  
40 “About MCC.” Millennium Challenge Corporation. Millennium Challenge Corporation – United States of 
America. Web. 27 Jan 2016. 
41 “Open Data Catalog” Millennium Challenge Corporation. Millennium Challenge Corporation – United State of 
America. Web. 27 Jan 2016. 
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before, there has not been the evolution one would hope for in terms of governance or with 
respect to incomes. In many cases, this may not be a major issue, for the governance of a country 
need not evolve as rapidly if it has already reached a fairly open level. Future analyses 
specifically on the impacts of the MCC would be of interest in further research as the 
organization builds a longer history. However, we can here say that recipient selection appears 
on a positive trend as shown in (3), a positive statement on American foreign aid policy. 
  Models (1) and (2) both show that US aid does not appear to have a significant influence 
on income and development on a country. If this is the case, what happens to the foreign aid? 
Brautigam writes that “…donors have frequently continued to fund projects outside of the 
budget, and thus outside of any possible review by parliament. This can have the effect of 
reinforcing an already strong presidentialism, and making it more difficult for the legislature to 
exercise its role.”4243 This is not a full explanation, as much of foreign aid comes from donor 
states who are also interested in democracy. But the idea that foreign aid makes the leadership of 
a nation-state less accountable to their own government and more so to foreign interests is 
logically an obstacle to democratic self-governance. If the competition dynamic which we have 
observed is at play in a given state, then the recipients of aid would be even less acquiescent to 
the positions of their parliament and more likely to follow the whims of their donors, states with 
competing interests, and perhaps even a vested interest in chaos in the recipient state. The 
International Financial Institution Advisory commission has given a sobering account on 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans: “The use of IMF resources and conditionality to 
control the economies of developing nations often undermines the sovereignty and democratic  
                                                             
42 Brautigam, D. (2000) Aid Dependence and Governance. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International. 
43 Knack, S. (2004), Does Foreign Aid Promote Democracy?. International Studies Quarterly, 48: 251–266. 
doi: 10.1111/j.0020-8833.2004.00299.x 
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processes of member governments receiving assistance. IMF staff often admit (with pride) that 
the executive branch of borrowing nations likes to use IMF conditions to exact concessions from 
their legislatures. While this mechanism may sometimes work to achieve desirable reforms, it 
often does so by shifting the balance of power within countries in ways that distort the 
constitutionally established system of checks and balances.”44 If the IMF, “…accountable to the 
188 countries that make up its near-global membership,”45 has this attitude, the effect is likely 
exacerbated when donor states have an influence on the politics of a state. 
 The competition between states is a trend that has played out in developing states across 
the globe. One example that bears study is the case of the Kyrgyz Republic, or Kyrgyzstan, a 
former Soviet satellite state in Central Asia. Both the United States and the Russian Federation 
have a deeply vested strategic interest in this state; the proximity of Kyrgyzstan to the Middle 
East and Afghanistan makes it a useful location for a US base, while Russia takes an interest in 
keeping the Kyrgyz Republic within its sphere of influence due of course to its geographic 
location and their historical relationship. For example, in July 2009, “President Bakiyev signs 
into law a deal to allow the US to continue using Manas airbase to support troops in Afghanistan, 
after US agreed to more than triple the annual rent it pays for the base to $60m,” while 
simultaneously tentatively giving Russia approval to erect a second base in the Central Asian 
state.46 In 2013, the Russian Federation pledged to give military assistance to Kyrgyzstan starting 
at the end of 2013 and continuing through 2014, with a total of $1.1 billion in military pledges.47 
The Kyrgyz Republic is a prime example of a state that is of interest to multiple states, and a  
                                                             
44 International Financial Institution Advisory Commission (2000) Final report to the Joint Economic Committee, 
the Congress of the United States, March 8. 
45 “IMF – About.” International Monetary Fund. International Monetary Fund. Web. 27 Jan 2016. 
46 “Kyrgyzstan Profile – Timeline.” BBC News. The BBC. Web. 27 Jan 2016. 
47 “Russia to Start Sending Weapons to Kyrgyzstan This Year.” Sputnik. Sputnik. 26 Jun 2013. Web. 27 Jan 2016. 
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prime target for donor competition. Both the US and Russia are involved in the Republic for 
their own self-interest, and they utilize funding in differing and at times contradictory ways.  
  USAID in Kyrgyzstan primarily invests in democracy, economic growth, and education, 
but is only part of the US - Kyrgyz financial picture. With respect to democracy, USAID “helps 
instill the rule of law and respect for human rights by supporting the judiciary, defense lawyers 
and activists that monitor and advocate for human rights.”48 The document goes on to say that 
the United States is investing in future generations through civic education and political 
participation efforts. While this mission is ostensibly laudable, it certainly puts the government 
of Kyrgyzstan on a path quite unlike the system followed or preferred by neighborhood 
powerhouse Russia. As observers have seen in the highly publicized Ukrainian crisis at 
Euromaidan, Westernization and liberalization of countries in the Russian sphere of influence 
creates tension in the region. Also responsible for tension in the region is the aforementioned 
base at Manas, which during its existence was “…the second biggest source of income [behind a 
gold mine]” for the Republic.49 With the base representing such an investment, it appears the 
democracy promotion was secondary to the military interests of the US. Certainly, the existence 
of a US-allied liberal democracy so close to Russia could be a potential future threat.    
In fact, the Russian Federation has stated that this behavior has influenced their foreign 
policy, and these third party countries are often caught in the middle. As mentioned previously, 
sources such as the Kommersant newspaper reported that “Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan…will 
receive $1.5 billion for military spending…[in] response to US attempts to gain a foothold in  
                                                             
48 “Kyrgyz Republic – Country Profile.” USAID: From the American People. USAID. Web. 27 Jan 2016 
49 Hartley, Morgan and Walker, Chris “The US Spent Billions in Kyrgyzstan, But Is Leaving Without a Trace.” 
Forbes. Forbes. 25 Sep 2013. Web. 27 Jan 2016. 
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Uzbekistan.”50 51 This move by the Russian Federation would certainly suggest some residual 
tension between the two major powers. But what has been the situation on the ground in 
Kyrgyzstan? This transition to democracy has appeared slow, with reports that “[In 2015]…the 
new leadership has largely failed to deliver on promises to remove corruption”52 and later that 
year “… the country’s political parties are the same rent-seeking patronage machines they were 
before, and fundamental problems with the administration of elections have only gotten 
worse.”53 It is hard to track down the cause of this phenomenon entirely, but the scrutiny of two 
major powers in this country appears unable to address the fundamental problems that prevent 
the political and economic development of the country. Arguably, the tug-of-war between the US 
and the Russian Federation has played a part in this enabling of the less-than-democratic regime 
in place in the Kyrgyz Republic.  
 I believe that there is a “TIT FOR TAT” dynamic existing, a phenomenon noted by 
Robert Axelrod.54 TIT FOR TAT is simply beginning with cooperation at first, and then 
responding based on the previous player’s action in an iterated game. I believe that this dynamic 
provides some explanation for the effects we see here; with no directly competing interests, the 
US and Russia will not behave aggressively, but will later act based on what the other did 
previously. Axelrod places this behavior in the context of the Cold War, but this exploratory 
study indicates that the phenomenon may still be at play in foreign aid competition scenarios. 
                                                             
50 “Киргизию и Таджикистан вооружат российскими деньгами.” Kommersant. 6 Nov 2012. Web. 1 Feb 2016.  
51 Kucera, Joshua. “Report: Russia Spending $1.3 Billion to Arm Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan.” EurasiaNet.org. The 
Open Society Institute. 7 Nov 2012. Web. 1 Feb 2016. 
52 Standish, Reid. “Five Years on, has Kyrgyzstan’s Democratic Revolution Put Down Roots?” Foreign Policy. 7 
Apr 2015. Web. 1 Feb 2016.  
53 Schenkkan, Nate. “Central Asia’s Island of Diplomacy is Sinking.” Foreign Policy. 30 Sep 2015. Web. 1 Feb 
2016. 
54 Axelrod, David. The Evolution of Cooperation: Revised Edition. New York: Basic Books, 1984, Print. 
 Schumann 36 
This undergraduate thesis does not seek to solve the problems endemic with foreign 
policy, but it generates some new evidence using modern data that foreign aid, while not 
problematic in theory, tends to create more geopolitical competition and exacerbate conflict 
rather than solve it. There is some rewarding evidence that the US has moved towards selection 
of less corrupt countries, and organizations such as the Millennium Challenge Corporation may 
have played a part in that move. On the other hand, there is little evidence as presented in this 
thesis that United States foreign aid has any impact on the democratic or economic development 
of a targeted country, at least in the snapshots of the 2010s that we have been able to analyze 
here. Additionally, there is foreign aid competition between the major world powers of the US, 
Russia, and China, which appears to create extreme versions of “inefficiencies.” The case study 
of the Kyrgyz Republic here is one such example, but there are many cases worldwide where 
foreign aid from multiple major powers has not improved the livelihood of the people, despite 
this stated goal.  
 There are imperfections with this analysis which would serve as compelling areas of 
further research. The largest area where this would be the case is in the breadth of data: while 
there is some effective data from 2011-2013 or 2014, the lack of complete data for all of these 
years has hampered my ability to complete long-run econometric analyses on the entire decade, 
or stretching back to 2000, and future series could provide more evidence of trends. This analysis 
of the 2010s indicates a lack of clear influence of foreign aid on CPI in the short terms; on the 
other hand, if the relationship between P5 funding and good governance is not strictly linear, but 
rather stops and starts, this may not be captured in this type of analysis. Including instruments 
such as Gini coefficients would also be useful; this is a metric with limited availability outside all 
but the most industrialized states, but it may be a better indicator of the “on-the-ground” situation  
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in a nation-state than per capita GDP, of which a large portion may be held by the upper 
echelons of society in a developing country. In summary, better data would help this style of 
analysis to not only provide information to the next election cycle, but really indicate the long-
term effectiveness, or lack thereof, of foreign aid.  
Aggregate analyses have important caveats which must be kept in mind. Most 
importantly, the scale of the analysis is simply too large to account for all the mitigating factors 
that may exist in an individual state. Thus, it is difficult to make a fully causal claim with respect 
to this type of analysis; nevertheless, models such as the difference-in-difference models above 
do have some additional explanatory power. Additionally, there are variables that are difficult to 
quantify at the aggregate level, such as individual policymaker behavioral effects that may 
influence the dispersal of aid in a recipient state. It may be useful to think of these aggregate 
analyses as road maps that guide the reader and policymaker to look in a certain direction, rather 
than prescriptive formulas that solve often subjective policy issues. 
Additionally, the aforementioned problem with lags remains an issue. With more data, it 
would be a useful and interesting exercise to examine whether lags from further back (i.e. US 
ODA lagged 10 years) has a significant effect on GDP per capita in a state, for instance. This 
would allow us to make some of the long-run claims that could be useful for a policymaker. 
 Nonetheless, this analysis is a starting point in seeing that while the Cold War may 
officially be over, there is still residual tension between major countries vying for supremacy in a 
state or region of the world. Ultimately, this indirect conflict has led to the delay of developing 
countries where large portions of the world’s population lives, and this conflict must be 
addressed if foreign aid is to become what its proponents wish it to be: a way for the developed  
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countries of the world to give back to the world and make this planet a more peaceful, 
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